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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Markcus Raymond May appeals from the dismissal with prejudice of his 
Post-Conviction Petition Fifth District Court Case No. CV-2013-0001240 filed 
March 25, 2013 and dismissed without an evidentiary hearing on October 11, 2013. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. May disputes the factual findings of the state and court in this case. 
he asserts actual innocence, and claimes he only plead guilty due to counsels 
refusal to go to trial and present 'any' evidence in his behalf at all. Mr May 
has and does assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Mr. Ben Anderson. 
who not only lied to Mr. May about the plea deal, but refused to prepare for 
trial or go to trial. Ads Mr. may indicated in his petition and at hearing, when 
he tried to fire Mr. Anderson for refusing to defend him in any fashion, the 
trial court refused to remove counsel and threatened Mr. May with deprivation of 
due processes if he did not continue with counsel and plead guilty. 
When Mr. May filed a motion to withdraw his plea due to an actual innocence 
claim, supported with colorable evidence, the trial court again threatened Mr. 
may and refused to a 11 ow a p 1 ea withdraw prior to sentencing, and refused to 
allow evidentiary on the claims and evidence submitted by Mr. May. 
In the Post-Conviction proceedings, the district court refused to allow Mr. 
May to present any of the evidence that supports his actual innocence claim. 
Furthermore, the court refused to consider Mr. May's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, even though the record clearly indicated that there was a 
documented conflict of interest with counsel for refusing to prepare for trial or 
do anything except force his client to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit. 
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Mr. May is completely unable to refer to specific pages in the record due to 
the courts refusla to provide him with the record and evidence and exhibits used 
against him at trial or at the post-conviction proceedings. Repeated requests to 
counsel and the court for the record has met with no reply. Notification to the 
Idaho Supreme Court that Mr. May did not posses the record necessary to prepare 
his appeal has been ignored. No record of evidence and exhibits has been provided 
to Mr. May at any time. An example of this is that Mr. May does not even have a 
copy of his sentence and judgment. Or access to any pre-trial transcripts, Motion 
to Withdraw plea transcripts, or the plea hearing transcripts. The police reports 
or any of the evidence used against him at any time. Mr. May claims that this 
refusal to provide him with any necessary documents to efectuate his appeal and 
petitions is a deni a 1 of due processes and contrary to consti tuti ona 1 
protections, which in turn prejudices his rights and case. 
The evidenc that exists that prove that Mr. May had a colorable claim of 
innocence is the fact that the so called vistims and states witnesses testified 
at the prreliminary hearing on September 3, 2010: That they in fact blocked the 
road with their bodies preventing Mr. may from driving thru, stopping him with 
the intehnt on doing him harm. Mr. Newman and Mr. Lambert threatend Mr. May, and 
admittadly had a weapon (see 911 call made by Lambert stating to the operator he 
woulci shoot May with his gun. 
Mr. May upon being detained by the assailants and fearing for his safety 
reached into his vehicle and obtained a gun and fired a number of shots into the 
parked car that was empty to warn off the ass a i 1 ants. One round ri cacheted off 
the vehicle and struck Lambert in the leg. The evidence of the ricocheted round 
was not allowed into evidence nor the circumstances surrounding it. 
The assailants own actions and testimony prove they were the aggressers, and 
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that May had a right to defend himself when the assailants admitted they blocked 
the road in an effort to detain and obviously assault May. They admittedly were 
armed, and had evil intent toward May, knowing he was attempting to reach a house 
on the block on the other side of their position. These two acts: Intentionally 
detaining while blocking the right of way, while armed, is conducive to a 
'hold-up' or highway robbery, or kidnapping by force, all of which are felonies 
giving Mr. May the legal right to arm himself and defend himself with whatever 
means necessary, and if the assailant was injured in the process, the law states 
he has taken his life in his own hands through his illegal actions and Mr. may is 
not in the least responsible for any illegal act. Least of all assault of the 
assaliants themselves. 
Mr. may was entitled to withdraw his plea! Mr. May was entitled to have 
counsel that would provide him with a defense at trial in the least. And Mr. May 
was entitled to remove that counsel when it refused to provide constitutional due 
processes entitled to every citizen. Furthermore, the trial court had no right to 
threaten Mr. May when his counsels ineffectivness was brought to his attention 
and a trial was requested. 
The level of constitutional error in this case is profound. The impropriety 
of coercion and threat to plead guilty obvious. Mr. May had a right to withdraw 
his plea, go to trial, and fire counsel in order to do so. This was the issue in 
the petition, and the issue ignored by the district court as well as the trial 
court. 
Al so of note is the fact that Mr. Anderson promised Mr. May he would get a 
rider and do his time at a work center. Instead, Mr. May received 30 years for 
defendning himself, which was his right to do in all circumstances. 
(See: Preliminary hearing transcripts anci 911 recording)(See also: Plea withdraw 
hearing). 
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Mr. May plead guilty under protest, due to his counsel's insistence and the 
court's refusal to force counsel to do his job. Also, at the time of plea, Mr. 
May admitted shooting his gun and that one of the asailants was struck in the 
process. But he had always maintained that he was defending himself from 
assailants that accousted him, blocking his path, armed and dangerous for 
purposes of violence. This is not an admission of guilt, this is a defense. 
When Mr. may insisted on withdrawing his plea prior to sentencing based on 
an actual innocence claim and ineffective assistance of counsel, he had good 
cause to do so, and was within his right to assert the defense and go to trial. 
The court abused its discretion when it refused to allow the plea withdraw, and 
refused to eliminate counsel that refused to go to trial with the defense. 
Mr. may's motion to withdraw his plea (prior to sentencing) was denied, and 
his right to appeal violated and also denied. His post-conviction was his only 
opportunity to address the issue and it has been denied without due processes or 
consideration of the actual innocence evidence and claims. 
As already stated, the assailants admitting that they were armed and 
blocking the road, with motive and intent to harm Mr. may, is enough colorable 
evidence to have justified withdrav-Jing the plea based on an actual innocence 
claim, and is enough evidence to warrant a proper evidentiary hearing 
considering the plea withdraw and right o trial to present a defense of self 
defense and right to defend when detained unlawfully on a public highway. 
Every citizen of this state has the right to defend in the same manner that 
Mr. may engaged in. And if he had even killed one of the assailants, his right 
would not have diminished in any manner, as it is the law of justification, and 
all robbers, kidnappers, assailants, and those intent on mayhem, take their 
lives into their own hands when they violate any citizens going about their 
business on a public road. 
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ISSUE ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING A PLEA WITHDRAWL PRIOR TO 
SENTENCING; AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MR. MAY'S 
PLEA WAS KNOWING; WILLING; AND WITHOUT DURESS! 
ARGUMENT 
The Appellant points out that he attempted to withdraw his plea, asserting 
actual innocence prior to trial; Tried to fire counsel for his refusal to go to 
trial and present Appellant's affirmative defense; And was prejudiced by the 
court when the court refused to allow disqualification of counsel and provide the 
Appellant withdraw of plea and go to trial on the good cause shown of actual 
innocence. The trial court did not officially accept the plea until sentencing, 
so at the time of the motion to withdraw the plea, Appellant had a right to 
withdraw for the good cause of assertion of actual innocence. 
Appell ant argues that a defendant may withdraw a pl ea of guilty or nol o 
contendere 'for any reason or no reason" before the court accepts the plea. A 
defendant maywithdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere after the court accepts 
it but before the court imposes a sentence if: (1) the court rejects a plea 
agreement under Rule 11; or (2) the defendant provides "a fair and just reason" 
for requersting ther withdrawal. An assertion of innocence is just reason and 
cause. (See: Issue Two). (See also: U.S. v. Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 
2005). Courts must seriously consider all claims of innocence when the motion to 
withdraw is timely. (see: Rule 11 and Ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
below. 
A gulity plea is not knowing and voluntary if induced by counsels' faulty 
legal advice regarding elements of possible defense. U.S. v. Streater, 70 F.3d 
1314, 1318 (D.C.Cir. 1995). A fair and just reason existed to withdraw 
Appellant's plea because defense counsel grossly mischaracterized defendant's 
possible innocence. (see: Davis, supra.). 
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To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must sho~, that 
counsel's representation fell below objective standard of resonableness, and that 
there was reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
result of proceeding would have been different; this standard applies to claims 
of ineffective assistance occurring at trial or sentencing and to ineffective 
assistance claims arising out of plea processes. (See: U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 6 and 
Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 825 P.2d 94 (1992); the issue on appeal from 
the dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief is whether the 
application alleges facts which, if true, would entitle the applicant to relief. 
Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 780 P.2d 153 (Ct.App.1989). 
May argues that the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, without allowing the 
evidence necessary to support his claims. Relying on counsels contraversion alone 
when the record showed an attempt to withdraw the plea and conflict of interest 
with counsel ignorred by the trial court and dismissed, is an abuse of 
descretion. May's application alleges that his legal representation was 
ineffective because (1) he refused to present May's defense and go to trial, (2) 
counsel refused to move for withdrawal of his guilty plea, (3) counsel lied to 
May about the sentence, "telling May he would get a rider and do his time at the 
work center," ( 4) when their was a conflict of interest and May wanted Ben 
Anderson to withdraw, Anderson lied to the court about the circumstances and 
conflict and the court threatened May to keep Anderson as counsel or proceed 
without counsel, disregarding the actual innocence claim. 
claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under tf1e 
tw-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See also: Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272, 787 P.2d 258 
( 1990). The latter "prejidice" requirement focuses on whether counsel's 
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ineffective performance affected the outcome of the case. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Strickland v. Washington 
applies to claims of ineffective assistance arising out of the plea process. Hill 
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. at 370. Where, as here, a defendant ir 
represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea depends on 
whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys 
in criminal cases. Hill, supra, at 56 and at 369. 
Appellant argues that counsel has a professional duty to inform his client 
of the practical implications of exercising his right to trial. see: Idaho Rules 
of Professional Conduct, Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities (1990). Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct 1. 2 (a) pro vi des, "A lawyer sha 11 abide by a 
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... " Although the 
attorney assumes res pons i bi l ity for the means employed to pursue those 
objectibves, it is for the client to determine the ultimate purposes served by 
the legal representation. The Appellant specifically set for the grounds for his 
apllication and ineffective assitance claims in his petition and under oath to 
the district court as required by I.C. § 19-4903. 
The granting of denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is left to 
the discretion of the district court judge. the exercise of this discretion is 
affected by the timing of the motion to withdraw, State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 
799,761 P.2d 1151 (1988). A less rigorous standard applies to a motion made 
before sentencing, requiring that the defendant present a "just reason" for 
withdrawing the plea. Ballard, 114 Idaho at 801. 761 P.2d at 1153. Appellant's 
good cause reason of actual innocence, and conflict of interest and lies of his 
counsels deceptions supported a plausible reason for withdrawal and dictated 
granting the motion. see: United States v. Webster, 468 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1972). 
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Appellant argues that because he had not been sentenced yet, and the court 
was waiting for the presentence report, deferring acceptance until it can be 
reviewed, he may freely withdraw his plea. U.S. v. Shaker, 279 F.3d 494, 497 (7th 
Cir. 2002). See also: U.S. v. DeBusk, 15 F.3d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1994). If the co-
urt was going to reject the plea May should have been advised of options to stand 
by plea, withdraw it and attempt to renegotiate, or withdraw it and go to trial. 
Because the court already knew may wanted to withdraw, the court did not inform 
May of these options or a 11 ow witndraw when the promises were not going to be 
kept, which is obvious from the 30 year sentence. A complete surprise to May. In 
re Vasquez-Ramirez, 443 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2006). 
Although May admitted an act, its action alone is governed by self defense, 
and therefore not a crime. The factual basis requirement protects a defendant 
from voluntarily pleading guilty without realizing that his conduct is not 
actually within the charge. See: McCarthy v. U.S. 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969). There 
was no adequate f actua 1 basis to accept May's p 1 ea because the record fa i 1 ed to 
clearly reflect evidence the trial court relied upon to find that May possessed 
requisite intent for crime convicted. 
Appellant argues that if a defendant enters a guilty plea while continuing 
to assert his or her innocence, then the plea is only constitutionally acceptable 
if there is strong evidence of guilt. see: N.C. v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 
(1970). A defendant is entitled to an opportinuty to show innocence if there is 
no factual basis to support guilt and the record supports a claim of actual 
innocence as in May's case. See: U.S. v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 113-14 (3rd Cir. 
1999). The trial courts acceptance of May's plea without sufficient factual 
basis for the charge was plain error effecting his substantial rights. see: U.S. 
v. Monzon, 429 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (9th Cir.2005). Furthermore, the court or state 
cannot induce a guilty plea by threatening defendant or by mental coercion 
overbearing defendant's will. Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). 
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ISSUE TWO 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING MR. MAY'S POST-CONVICTION PETITION 
WITHOUT APPL YING AN ACTUAL INNOCENCE STANDARD OF REVIEW- AND ALLOWING 
EVIDENTIARY PROCESSES TO MAKE SUCH AN DETERMINATION! 
ARGUMENT 
The Appellant asserted an actual innocence claim and forthright claim of 
defense to his counsel, and the court at the onset of the criminal proceedings. 
counsel's failure and refusal to administer the defense, courced Appellant into a 
plea, and the court refused to force counsel to defend Appellant even when it was 
made clear to the court that he was only pleading guilty due to counsels 
ineffectivness and conflict of interest. The court disregard the claim of 
innocence and disregarded the conflict of interest, and prohibited the withdraw 
of the pl ea. The district court in the post-conviction proceedings refused to 
consider or allow review of Appellant's evidence that supported his claim, or 
revie\tJ of the evidence that wholly supported counsels failure, including the 
attempt by May to fire counsel prior to sentencing. The record itself supported 
May's claims, and the district court erred in simply relyting on the same 
counsels claims to dismiss the petition without making inquiries into the 
evidence that supported actual innocence. and erred in not providing may with the 
record of the exhibits submitted by the state but withheld by the court and state 
from the petitioner and appellant. These errors have greatly prejudiced 
Appellant's right to due processes and a meaningly appeal and petition. 
The Appellant argues that he has credible showing of "actual • II innocence 
under Schulp v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). See 
also: Lee v. Lambert, 633 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2011). 
The actual innocence exceptions to reviewing a courced plea and conviction 
'serves as an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer 
an unconstitutional loss of liberty,' guaranteeing that the ends of justice will 
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~vill be served in full." McCeskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 
L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). See also: Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 
L.Ed/ .2d 1067 (1976). 
/\s the Court v1arned in Holland: Id., at 2562. "It is difficult to imagine a 
stronger equitable claim for keeping open the courthouse doors than one of actual 
innocence. "the ultimate equity on the prisoner's side." Withrow v. vJilliams, 507 
U.S. 680,700, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.ed.2d 407 (1993).(0'Connor,J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part)(noting that the Supreme Court "continuously has 
recognized that, a sufficient showing of actual innocence" is normally enough, 
"standing alone, to outweigh other concerns and justify adjudication of the 
prisoner's constitutional claims"). Indeed, "the individual interest in avoiding 
injustice is most compelling in the context of actual innocence." Schulp, 513 
U.S. at 324. 
/\n actual innocence exception to the provisions does not foster abuse or 
delay, but instead recognizes that in extraordinary cases, the social interests 
of finality, comity, and conserving judicial resources 'must yield to the 
imperitive of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration." Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). 
[C]oncern about the injustice that results from the conviction of an 
innocent person has long been at the core of our criminal justice system. That 
concern is reflected, in the "fundamental value determination of our society that 
it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." 513 
U.S. at 325 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 
368 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. May filed his post-conviction petition in a timely manner. He also 
submitted his Motion to Withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. furthermore, Mr. 
may went before the trial court prior to sentencing and attempted to explain the 
deprivation and assert his innocence and conflicts with counsels failures which 
courced him into believing he could not exercise his right to trial, all of which 
fell on deaf ears. These actions of the defendant/appellant preserved these 
issues for appeal, and should have been regarded without the unceramonious method 
of simply putting the counsel on the stand to lie again about his actions. It's a 
given that counsel is not going to admit their misconduct in the fifth district. 
Refusing to provide Mr. may with the record of his proceedings has also 
denied him fair due processes, but at the same time, it has notleft the errors 
wholly in the dark as the respondents would prefer. The colorable evidence of 
innocence is clear, profound, and readily available for the court to review and 
determine the validity of it, regardless of the deception of the state and 
counsel. 
the Supreme Court has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial 
power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take 
steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense. 
This elementary principle, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from the 
belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a 
defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial 
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake. In recognition of this right, the 
Supreme Court held over 30 years ago that once a State offers to criminal 
defendants the opportunity to appeal their cases, it must provide a trial 
transcript to an indigent defendant if the transcript is necessary to a decision 
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on the merits of the appeal. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 
L.Ed. 891 (1956). Since then, the Court has held that an indigent defendant may 
not be required to pay a fee before filing a notice of appeal of his conviction, 
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959). 
"Meaningful access to justice has been the consistent theme of these cases. 
We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself 
assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal trial 
is fundamentally unfair if the state proceeds against an indigent defendant 
without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the 
building of an effective defense." Fundamental fairness entitles indigent 
defendants to 'an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the 
adversary system." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 
(1974). See also: Britt v. north Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 432,433, 
30 L.ed.2d 400 (1971). 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
The appellant prays this Court will overturn his conviction, invalidate his 
guilty plea and order a trial on the evidence supporting actual innocence and his 
right to defend against unlawful actions against him. 
Dated This b day of }(oYet,ber, 2014. 
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